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A proper identity management approach is necessary for pervasive computing to be 
invisible to users. Federated identity management is key to achieving efficient identity 
blending and natural integration in the physical and online layers where users, devices, 
and services are present.
Adoption of new computing paradigms is usually hindered by the security challenges they bring. In the 
pervasive computing field, an element of paramount importance still requires deeper research—identity 
management (IdM)—the management of individual principals, their authentication, authorization, and 
privileges within or across system boundaries. Mark Weiser’s vision of a world in which technology 
becomes invisible to support people in their everyday lives is currently unrealizable without a continuous 
authentication system.1 
The goal is to create ambient intelligence where network devices embedded in the environment, from 
clothing to cars, homes, and the human body, provide unobtrusive connectivity and services all the time, 
thus improving human experience and quality of life without explicit awareness of the underlying 
communications and computing technologies.  
In this ubiquitous computing world, a change of context—for instance, users shifting location or new 
people appearing in the proximity—might involve new devices, services, and interaction possibilities. To 
gain access to pervasive services, users must often authenticate and expose different forms of their identity 
to the various services, which worsens user experience and conflicts with the goal of invisibility.  
IdM technologies have evolved to cope with the increasing number of services that users might access; 
federated identity management (FIM) is the latest approach, wherein a common set of policies, practices, 
and protocols links users’ electronic identity and attributes stored across multiple IdM systems. FIM’s 
ultimate goal is to enable users of one domain to securely access data or systems of another domain 
seamlessly—single sign-on (SSO) being the most popular functionality. However, current federation 
technologies rely on preconfigured static agreements, which aren’t well-suited for the open environments in 
pervasive computing scenarios. These limitations negatively impact scalability and flexibility. 
A new identity model for open environments is necessary. Thus, our contribution includes: 
 a definition of blended identity, which is the basis for applying FIM in open environments;
 a prototype risk-based architecture that extends and improves FIM to allow the creation of
dynamic federations; and
 design and validation of the risk assessment methodology that constitutes the main pillar of our
proposed architecture.
Our model enables continuous authentication so users can securely access services anytime and 
anywhere, with minimal interaction. The model is thus aligned with pervasive computing’s basic goals: 
invisibility, flexibility, scalability, and personalization.  
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The Challenges of Pervasive IdM 
When the first computers appeared, password-based authentication was the core mechanism of IdM 
IdM. This mechanism worked fairly well at that time, owing largely to how little data it actually needed to 
protect. However, with the advent of the Internet, the explosion of personal devices and online applications, 
and the increase in transactions, IdM became far more complex. Today, we’re asked to prove our identities 
every time we board a plane; check in to a hotel; make a credit card purchase; and log on to a computer, 
smartphone, smart TV, or website. Therefore, users face a mental burden, known as password fatigue, 
which frequently leads them to devise strategies that degrade the security of their protected information. 
For instance, users might employ the “poor man’s SSO” strategy, reusing the same passwords. 
In the past decade, FIM frameworks and protocols, such as Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML), WS-Federation, OAuth, and OpenID, came on to the scene to ameliorate the problems related to 
password-based authentication and allow identity portability across disparate domains.2 Successful 
implementations have been deployed in the Web domain, especially in the education and research fields 
and the social Internet arena. Despite this advance in IdM, important open issues remain.  
Two influential works analyze IdM problems and formulate identity’s seven laws3 and flaws.4 Both 
studies point out that two factors are indispensable: security aspects, such as privacy, minimal disclosure, 
and mutual authentication, and effective human integration, such as natural interaction and easy interfaces. 
Furthermore, they highlight trust establishment as key for scalability. Although FIM protocols can cover 
security aspects, usability and trust challenges are unsolved.  
Whereas the research community has addressed IdM in pervasive computing, there’s still scarce work in 
the context of applying FIM to it. Some proposals introduce mechanisms for SSO and seamless access 
control, but they’re usually limited to a particular scenario or set of devices.5,6 We need to evolve IdM one 
step further; the merging and usage of well-known FIM protocols seems a natural approach. 
Blended Identity 
Identity must be reformulated for FIM’s application in pervasive computing. The seven laws and flaws 
fail to address the notion of convergence between the physical and online planes. This concern, coupled 
with proper handling of human interaction and trust management, leads to the concept of blended identity. 
Identity has both a digital and a physical component. Some entities might have only an online or 
physical representation, whereas others might have a presence in both planes. IdM requires relationships 
not only between entities in the same planes but also across them. 
Users move around the pervasive world carrying various personal devices that comprise a personal 
network (PN). This dynamic network changes when users are in motion, for instance, going from a smart 
home to a smart office. Devices join and leave, services appear and disappear, and access control must 
adapt to maintain the user perception of being continuously and automatically authenticated.  
To accomplish this, federations must be established to create trust relationships between devices and 
services to securely exchange identity data. For example, when users log in to their smartphone, 
authentication is seamlessly transferred to the rest of their PN devices. When they move to the office, the 
smartphone’s authentication isn’t enough to access office devices, such as a printer or corporate Web 
services. Thus, another identity source—in this case, the online corporate database—must provide the 
users’ job identity and extend and establish a federation with their PN for both physical and online access. 
All this should happen in the background beyond user consciousness. 
Hence, there are several coexisting identity sources, called identity providers (IdPs), and several services 
requiring identity data, which service providers (SPs) offer. Roles can shift, and both physical devices and 
online providers can offer services. A universal IdP can’t be assumed because SPs requires different 
identity assurances and attributes in different contexts. Furthermore, in pervasive scenarios, it’s unrealistic 
to assume that interactions always take place between known entities or that an administrator has 
preconfigured the required trust relationships among every party to guarantee secure operations. Pervasive 
environments are dynamic, multiprovider, and multiservice. Preconfiguration isn’t feasible because it 
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simply doesn’t scale. 
Current FIM protocols  suffer from limitations that make the described level of identity blending unat-
tainable.2 Nowadays, it’s possible to achieve SSO only across online services in closed domains with a 
previously established trust relationship. In addition to these FIM protocols’ lack of flexibility, they neglect 
the remaining possible relationships: SSO across devices in a PN, PN federations with other PNs or smart 
environments, SSO from physical devices to online services, and SSO from online services to physical 
devices. 
To address these concerns, blended identity should efficiently combine the physical and digital planes to 
achieve IdM for pervasive computing. Users should authenticate automatically and continuously to the 
smart services and devices, whether online or in the digital or physical plane, and the environment should 
adapt and personalize accordingly. 
Blended identity requires a natural interface and dynamic trust relationships. An easy-to-use interface 
should choose the best IdP automatically and authenticate users anytime and anywhere in continuously 
changing contexts. In addition, relationships between SPs and IdPs shouldn’t be based only on 
preconfiguration. Establishing new trust connections based on risk assessment should be possible. 
A Continuous Authentication System 
Alternative proposals to achieve more streamlined authentication processes in pervasive computing 
environments are flawed (see the “Related Work in Pervasive Computing Authentication” section). 
Our proposed solution has three big advantages. First, unlike several proposed models, it doesn’t require 
users to carry a new device. Second, it leverages current FIM protocols for SSO, which are properly 
integrated and extended. Thus, it’s easier to deploy than other solutions defining new protocols, and it’s 
compatible with existing providers. Finally, when interacting parties are unknown to each other, a new trust 
relationship can be established based on risk assessment, providing greater flexibility and scalability. 
Our model integrates different authentication sources and identity data naturally. Unlike other work, it 
dynamically establishes federations between previously unknown IdPs and SPs. This powerful feature has a 
potential positive impact on business ecosystems, because instant virtual enterprises could be created at any 
moment and share user data to offer personalized services. Users will be constantly authenticated across 
these services, enjoying a real ubiquitous experience.  
Architecture 
Figure 1 shows the architecture for implementing continuous authentication. Because it’s based on FIM 
standards, it provides security services—that is, authorization, integrity, and confidentiality—and enhanced 
services and privacy mechanisms, such as SSO, single logout, account linkage, and transient and persistent 
pseudonym identifiers.2 Furthermore, it meets the additional interface design and dynamic trust 
establishment requirements to realize the blended identity vision.  
The architecture’s main element is the users’ primary device—any device that includes the modules that 
act as IdP or IdP proxy. When operating as an IdP, the device directly provides user identity data that 
doesn’t require third-party attestation, for example, to authenticate against other devices. When operating 
as IdP proxy, it selects and reroutes authentication requests to the most suitable IdP and performs 
continuous SSO according to the operation flow we describe later. These requests can be processed in any 
FIM protocol through the FIM connectors module in Figure 1. 
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Second, the primary device executes an identity-matching algorithm to determine the most suitable IdP 
to answer the authentication request based on local policies, and then reroutes it.  
Third, the selected IdP or the device decides whether to authenticate users against the SP. If the SP is 
known and a trust relationship exists, SSO messages are exchanged following the FIM protocol in use, and 
users are authenticated. If the SP is unknown, the IdP gathers publicly available information about it, 
including metadata, policies, and reputation; assesses risk; and decides on the fly whether to federate and 
share identity data. The reputation protocol is designed to avoid attacks from malicious nodes8; this has 
been investigated in related work.9 Reputation and risk data are combined using fuzzy logic based on “E-
commerce Trust Metrics and Models.”10 The complexity of the relationship between these two factors is 
tackled by linguistic labels that assign quantitative values from thresholds, allowing decision making about 
cooperation using conditional rules. We call this process of establishing a new trust relationship dynamic 
federation. SSO messages are exchanged following the FIM protocol in use, and users are authenticated. 
Finally, authenticated users are granted seamless access to the pervasive service. 
According to SSO standard protocols, an active IdP session is required to transparently notify the 
requesting SPs of the authentication state; otherwise, users are first queried for their credentials. This 
proposed architecture requires an active session only on the primary device, for instance, unlocked with a 
fingerprint or biometric proof. Whenever required, the device authenticates to the rest of the IdPs on behalf 
of users by sending their credentials. 
Risk Assessment Methodology 
Deciding whether to federate an SP with an IdP isn’t a trivial task. Risk assessment entails identifying, 
evaluating, and estimating of quantitative or qualitative risk levels related to a concrete situation; 
comparing these levels against benchmarks; and determining of an acceptable risk level. Decision-making 
techniques assist in this procedure; we propose a methodology that provides a meaningful numerical model 
based on multicriteria decision making, which uses multidimensional risk–based inputs to evaluate the 
federation’s suitability.  
We use a methodology based on the multiattribute utility theory (MAUT), which compiles a list of 
aspects relevant for risk evaluation (N = 1, …, n), a partial score gi that indicates how good a provider A 
under evaluation is for each aspect N according to a measurement scale in the set of real numbers Si  R, 
and each criterion’s specific importance in the context of the provider (Wi).11 Index i numbers scores, 
weights, and scales ranging from risk aspect i=1 to risk aspect i=n.  
We derived the list of aspects in our risk assessment methodology directly from a taxonomy tailored for 
FIM that was created by analyzing FIM specifications and the public survey of Research and Education 
Federations (https://refeds.terena.org/index.php/Federations).12 This taxonomy considers a hierarchical-
based approach with five high-level categories—security and privacy, knowledge, interoperability, service 
specific risks, and historical interactions—each with subcriteria in the lower levels of the taxonomy.  
To assign the partial scores for a provider A gi(A), we defined a set of metrics related to every 
taxonomic category. In this article, we focus on assurance metrics that are the inverse of the probability of 
incurring in risk—that is, the higher the assurance, the lesser the risk, and vice versa. The process of 
defining the applicable metrics depends on the MAUT theory, which requires numerical values between 0 
and 1. However, the assurance scale format is mostly qualitative: no, low, medium, and high assurance. To 
solve this issue, we mapped each qualitative value to a quantitative one (0, 1, 2, or 3), which we then 
normalized. The final result is a vector that represents the partial normalized scores for each subcriterion 
([g1(A), …, gn(A)]), which we call the score vector(SV). 
Figure 2 exemplifies the quantification process for the security and privacy metric, including the 
mapping from the qualitative to quantitative scale. We obtained metric values based on the strength of the 
cryptographic algorithms in place, according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s 
recommendations.13 Figure 2c represents the source used to quantify the security and privacy metric that, 
in this example, is taken from a provider’s SAML metadata. 
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 Risk Evaluation  
To test the risk model, we used SAML metadata documents in public repositories. We selected two 
providers, SP A and B, and inferred relevant risk-related features from their metadata. For simplicity, we 
present only the results for the security and privacy category’s risk aggregation, but other criteria would be 
aggregated the same way. 
Figure 3 shows security and privacy’s risk aggregation for SP A and B both graphically and 
mathematically. Each subcriterion was evaluated against a four-level assurance scale ranging from 0 to 3; 
for example, a value of 2/3 means that the third assurance level is fulfilled. Figure 3c shows each SP’s 
score levels, and Figure 3d shows important differences between each SP’s security dimension values. 
Assuming the evaluating entity—that is, the users’ primary device acting as IdP—has the RV shown in 
Figure 3c, which leads to the associated WV, we can see that some dimensions have higher minimum 
assurance requirements than others. If the arithmetic mean is applied to aggregate the risk, then the two 
providers would have the same final security assurance value, even though they have different profiles and 
SP A clearly doesn’t fulfill the minimum requirements. This fact is easier to understand by comparing the 
RV in Figure 3a with the depiction of providers’ score vectors in the bar graph of Figure 3d. 
If we apply the proposed aggregation formula to the weights from the RV, SP A still has better 
assurance than SP B. The selection of the best SP is performed correctly only after using the ACI. Thus, 
from this use case, we prove that the risk model fulfills the initial goal, providing a meaningful unique 
value that assists in automatic decision making. 
Implementation Details 
We developed a proof-of-concept IdM infrastructure based on open source software and worked with an 
SAML-based SSO scenario containing users and several providers. This infrastructure has been extended to 
implement the logic for dynamic identity federation. This logic modifies the original SAML flow, which 
directly rejects requests from unknown providers to allow real-time evaluation and decision making. The 
users’ primary device is developed to comply with the SAML profile for mobile clients in an Android 
smartphone. For a richer set of IdPs, we programmed plug-ins for well-known online providers, such as 
Facebook. Thus, the primary device acts as both IdP and IdP proxy, letting users reuse their accounts. 
Pervasive computing requires a proper IdM approach so technology can actually transcend human 
consciousness. In this sense, FIM has great potential to achieve this goal and has been identified as a 
catalyst for the next Internet marketplace revolution.14 If realized, improved IdM can lower barriers for 
plug-and-play Business-to-business (B2B), Business-to-consumer (B2C), and Consumer-to-consumer 
(C2C) integration, leading to highly dynamic online business ecosystems in which users have a seamless 
and personalized experience.  
Our proposal constitutes a new step toward better IdM in pervasive environments. So far, we’ve 
successfully evaluated the risk aggregation model and tested the feasibility of establishing federations 
based on one risk dimension, and we plan to implement the whole model including all the risk criteria. We 
also aim to conduct usability studies that involve real users as well as performance tests for measuring 
overhead. 
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